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Alternative Approach to Automate Detection of DOM-XSS Vulnerabili-
ties 
Abstract: 
This thesis proposes an alternative methodology to detect DOM-XSS by building-up on the 
existing approach used by web scanners in detecting general XSS. Web scanners general 
approach is to inject payload in the web page inputs and check the received HTML response 
for possible cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. The thesis proposes to add an extra scan 
layer which is an actual browser that would be responsible for sending any request and ren-
der the received HTML response from webserver. Rendering the response causes any script 
in the page to be executed, hence any code that alters the page dynamic content causing 
DOM-XSS will reflect on the rendered response. Then the rendered response is checked for 
XSS vulnerabilities. The thesis methodology allows detecting both DOM-XSS and other 
types of XSS. To provide a proof of concept for this methodology, the thesis author created 
a web-based tool on that premises. The tool can open and control a browser which allows 
automated loading of web pages and scanning the rendered response for vulnerabilities. Fi-
nally, the tool provides detailed scan report that points out possible inputs that might cause 
XSS in order to assist penetration testers who prefer manual scans. 
Keywords: 
Cross-site scripting, DOM-XSS, web security, web scanner 
CERCS: P170, Computer science, numerical analysis, systems, control 
Pealkiri eesti keeles: Alternatiivne lähenemine automatiseeritud DOM-
XSS haavatavuste tuvastamisele 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Käesolevas lõputöös pakutakse välja alternatiivne meetod DOM-XSS tuvastamiseks, 
toetudes juba olemasolevatele lähenemistele, mida kasutavad erinevad XSS tuvastamise 
veebiskännerid. Veebiskännerite üldine lähenemine on selline, et kõikidesse 
skännitavatesse veebisisenditesse sisestatakse kood ning kontrollitakse HTML vastust, et 
tuvastada potentsiaalne XSS haavatavus. Antud lõputöös tehakse ettepanek tuua sisse 
lisaskännimise kiht, mis kujutab endast eraldi veebilehitsejat. See veebilehitseja vastutaks 
veebiserverisse kõikide päringute saatmise eest ja HTML vastuste kuvamise eest. Vastuse 
kuvamine käivitaks kõik lehel olevad programmikoodid.  Iga kood, mis muudab veebi sisu 
dünaamiliselt põhjustades DOM-XSS, kajastuks renderdatud vastuses. Kuvatud vastuses 
kontrollitakse XSS haavatavuse olemasolu. Käesoleva lõputöö meetod võimaldab tuvastada 
nii DOM-XSS kui ka teisi XSS liike. Selleks, et seda meetodit tõestada, on lõputöö autor 
loonud veebipõhise tööriista XSS tuvastamiseks. Antud tööriist suudab avada ja kontrollida 
veebilehitsejat, mis võimaldab automaatselt kuvatud veebilehe haavatavust kontrollida. 
Lõpuks annab tööriist väljundiks skännimisest tekkinud raporti, mis näitab potentsiaalseid 
XSS vastu haavatavaid sisendeid. See tööriist aitab penetratsiooni testijaid, kes eelistavad 
manuaalset testimist. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Cross-site scripting, DOM-XSS, veebi turvalisus, veebiskänner 
CERCS: P170, arvutiteadus, numbriline analüüs, süsteemid, kontroll 
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1 Introduction 
Cross-site scripting is one of the most common vulnerabilities in web applications. Latest 
Web security statistics reports show that cross-site scripting vulnerability has high likeli-
hood to be discovered in a web application.  The vulnerability is of an injection type, which 
means it allows hacker to inject malicious code into the website. The vulnerability is caused 
due to lack of proper encoding on user input data by the website. This allows hackers to 
inject malicious code that will be stored either on the website or in the URL that the victim 
is tricked to click. The vulnerability does not harm the website server itself, but will harm 
the website visitors. 
Although cross-site scripting was discovered long time ago, it still could be found in many 
websites including the ones that belong to big companies like Google, Facebook and others. 
These big companies usually have separate security team that are responsible of running 
manual and automated scans to discover any vulnerabilities before launching any website 
or pushing new updates to existing one. Despite that fact, security researchers are frequently 
reporting cross-site scripting vulnerabilities through their bug bounty programs. This means 
that the tools used to automate scan for cross-site scripting are still not capable of fully 
detecting different types of cross-site scripting or following specific paths in websites on its 
own.  
This thesis concentrate on the part of enhancing the methodology of scanner to detect DOM-
XSS. Most general web scanner detect cross-site scripting in general by analysing the re-
ceived HTML response of webpage and looking for XSS vulnerabilities based on the in-
jected payload. This approach is not capable of detecting DOM-XSS because the payload 
in that case would only reflect in the page after it has been rendered in the browser; hence 
scripts in the page are executed. Security researchers have proposed different methodology 
that could allow them to detect DOM-XSS using taint tracking or dynamic taint tracking. 
Both techniques propose to monitor if script in the page access page resources that include 
user input string and follow their execution until it reaches single or various sinks. There 
has been either standalone tool or integrated tool developed to proof their approach.  
This thesis proposes different approach to detect DOM-XSS that could be directly integrated 
into the general approach used by the web scanners which is to add an extra layer between 
the steps of receiving the HTML response from the web server and checking that response 
for possible cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. The layer is an actual browser which renders 
the HTML response causing any script in the page to get executed. This leaves the burden 
of analysing big or complicated JS code to the browser to render it. Then analysing that 
rendered response the same way used by web scanners would allow to find any DOM-XSS. 
Web scanners can manage to detect all types of cross-site scripting by analysing both re-
sponses. Since the methodology proposes communicating with an actual browser to render 
the HTML response, the browser could also be used to validate if injected payload gets 
executed which eliminates any false positive results. The tool targets reflected XSS vulner-
ability which could be caused by URL parameters as a proof of concept of the methodology. 
The thesis author developed a web-based tool as a proof of concept of the proposed meth-
odology. The tool uses Selenium to open and control browser as well as inject data into 
webpages. It follows the same process used by penetration testers in detecting inputs in the 
webpage then injecting them with unique payload to identify which of these inputs data 
reflect in both received and rendered response of the webpage. Then it choses list of possible 
payloads that can bypass user input filters or sanitization and get executed by the browser. 
The injected payload is tested in the browser to check if it will pop-up an alert box to elim-
inate any false positive results.  
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2 Background 
In the first section, the thesis author explains cross-site scripting (XSS) and its different 
types. He also explains the difference between HTML in the response received from the 
server and the one rendered by the browser. He also explains how scanner automates the 
process of detecting different types of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. Finally, he ex-
plains briefly the previous related work on automating detection of DOM-XSS.  
2.1 What is XSS? 
Cross-site scripting is an injection vulnerability that can be found in web applications. It 
allows hackers to inject malicious code that will be executed on the victim’s browser. This 
makes the vulnerability of an attack user type which means the vulnerability could be used 
to harm users of that vulnerable web application. 
Based on the vulnerability type, attacker can either store malicious code into the website or 
craft a link that has that malicious code and trick his victim to visit that webpage, which will 
then make the victim’s browser executes that code. The crafted code could allow a hacker 
to launch multiple different types of attack such as session hijacking, key logging, phishing 
and much more attacks [1]. 
Hackers can hijack a session through XSS vulnerability by injecting a malicious code that 
steals the session login cookie. The malicious injected code could also allow hackers to add 
keyboard listeners allowing them to log keyboard strokes by the victim. It can also manip-
ulate the DOM allowing the hacker to create fake forms, change the website layout or even 
redirect the victim to other websites. 
2.2 Types of XSS [2] 
Stored (persistent) 
Stored cross-site scripting vulnerability occurs when injected malicious code is saved into 
the website’s database without proper encoding. Then the next time any user request a page 
where this data should be displayed and the server does not do proper encoding before add-
ing it to the page dynamic content. For example: if a user adding a comment in web blog, it 
will be saved into database. Next time someone visits the blog the comment will be queried 
from the database and loaded into the page. If server does not do proper encoding in both 
scenarios to filter malicious code, it will store the malicious payload in its database. See 
Figure (1). 
Reflected 
Reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability occurs when malicious code is part of the request 
sent to the web server. The server sends back as part of the response. If the malicious code 
did not get the proper encoding, it will get executed by the browser causing reflected XSS. 
For example you can find the vulnerability in search bars that exists in websites that allows 
users to search for keywords. The vulnerability happens when the user input is not properly 
checked against malicious code and characters. See Figure (2). 
DOM-XSS 
This kind of vulnerability occurs when the script code found in the page inject the re-
flected/stored malicious code into the page dynamic content. This means that the malicious 
code will only appear after the victim’s browser renders the page, hence executing scripts. 
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On 2005 Amit Klein identified another kind of XSS vulnerability called DOM based cross-
site scripting or XSS of the third kind [3]. The vulnerability type was first identified as the 
malicious code that does not need to be sent back to server. For example, data after fragment 
identifiers [4] (commonly known as URL hash, #) in URLs do not get sent to the server and 
 
Figure 1. Stored XSS scenario. 
 
 
Figure 2. Reflected XSS scenario. 
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are processed at client-side. This means server will not receive any malicious code and hence 
user data encoding at the server side will not be enough to defend against this type of attack. 
But later with the massive use of javascript in websites which allowed manipulation of the 
page dynamic content, the DOM-XSS vulnerability was found to be a mix of reflected and 
stored XSS. This led researchers to re-identify cross-site scripting types to two general cat-
egories: server-XSS and client-XSS which both have two sub-categories stored and re-
flected. 
 Reflected server XSS occurs when the malicious code is injected in the URL and that code 
reflects in the received HTTP response while reflected client XSS also has the malicious 
code in the URL but it will only reflect in the page content after it is rendered by the browser; 
hence scripts in the page are executed. Stored server XSS is when the malicious payload is 
being stored in the website’s database and will appear directly in the received HTTP re-
sponse. Stored client XSS also has the code stored in website’s database but will only appear 
when the webpage is rendered. See Figure (3). 
Figure (4) shows an example of reflected client-XSS scenario. After the hacker has discov-
ered that the website has a DOM-XSS vulnerability, he crafted a link that contains malicious 
code and managed to get his victim to open it. When the victim’s browser loads the URL, it 
will send a request that contains the malicious code to website’s server. The HTML found 
in the server response will not contain the malicious code in it, which will bypass any XSS 
auditors. But when the browser renders that received HTML, the script in the page will get 
executed which will add the malicious code into the web page dynamic content allowing it 
to get executed. The example scenario could be found at: 
http://alert1.me/vuln/profile.html?accName=qwe&accID=%22%3E%3Cscrpt%3Eal-
ert(1)%3C/script%3E  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Types of XSS [5]. 
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2.3 Why is it important to tackle XSS? 
The web application hacker’s handbook [6] describes XSS attacks as follows: 
 “The Godfather of attacks against other users. It is by some measure the most prevalent 
web application vulnerability found in the wild.” 
Web security statistics reports like Edgescan [7] or Whitehat security [8] show that cross 
site scripting has a high likelihood of being discovered in web applications as shown in 
Figures (5) and (6) respectively. This is partially due to the fact that some web developers 
do not have the appropriate training for secure coding. Although it is not always necessarily 
the reason as there are a lot of discovered XSS bugs in websites owned by big companies 
which have dedicated security teams that run manual and automatic penetration testing but 
still missed detecting these vulnerabilities. That proves that XSS vulnerabilities can appear 
in the most unexpected places in a website, especially in complicated websites that gets 
updated frequently in order to add more features which might use unsafe user data. That is 
why a lot of companies  like: Microsoft, Facebook, Google and so forth offer bug bounty 
programs to encourage security researchers to report found bugs by offering rewards for 
their bug reporting [9]. 
 
Figure 4. DOM-XSS scenario. 
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2.4 Server response versus rendered response 
In this section, thesis author will explain the difference between HTML code found in the 
received response and the rendered response after browser loads the web page.  
When user tries to open a web page in browser, it sends HTTP request to website’s server. 
The server handle the request and then replies with a response that contains HTML of that 
web page. Then browser parses and corrects that HTML response and builds the document 
object model (DOM)[10] which is a map of where objects displayed in the page, cascaded 
style sheet object model (CSSOM) and render tree [11]. The render process adds objects 
found in the HTML to the webpage and also executes any scripts found in the server re-
sponse. Such scripts can alter and add new objects to DOM which makes the server response 
different than the rendered one by the browser.  
 
Figure 5. Web vulnerability likelihood in Edgescan statistics report. 
 
 
Figure 6. Web vulnerability likelihood in WhiteHat statistics report. 
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For an example of the difference between HTML response and the rendered response, the 
thesis author created a simple web page that has a script which adds a paragraph div into the 
page body. Figure (7) shows the HTML of the received response which does not have any 
data in the page body. But when the browser loads the web page and executes the script, it 
will inject a paragraph inside the page body as shown in Figure (8). 
2.5 Scanners approach to detect general XSS 
This section explains the approach taken by scanners to detect cross-site scripting vulnera-
bilities in general. General web vulnerability scanners use a black-box testing approach in 
which website implementation is not known to scanner. The scanner starts by sending HTTP 
request to the website’s server and then analyses the received response for possible vulner-
able inputs. Then it injects payload from a predefined payload list into the possible vulner-
able input and send request with that malicious payload. Once again, the response is ana-
lysed to confirm that injected payload could cause XSS vulnerability [12]. See Figure (9). 
 
Figure 7. Example of HTML from server response. 
 
 
Figure 8. Example of rendered response. 
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This approach is not capable of detecting DOM-XSS on its own as the vulnerable input’s 
data reflects only after scripts in the page get executed.  
2.6  Related Work 
There are different set of academic tools (DexterJS, DOMinator, Flax, Xenotix and the tool 
developed by Sebastian Lekies, Ben Stock and Martin Johns) that address the issue of auto-
mating detection of DOM-XSS vulnerabilities. Their approaches vary between creating a 
standalone tool or browser-integrated one that does either taint tracking or dynamic taint-
tracking in order to identify vulnerable JS code that causes DOM-XSS. The following is a 
brief overview of these tools.  
DexterJS 
DexterJS uses taint tracking to detect DOM-XSS. It acts as a trusted MiM proxy to intercept 
any request from browser and identify scripts in the page. Then it rewrites these scripts to 
perform character-precise taint tracking and pass the result to exploit generator which create 
an attack vector that could cause DOM-XSS [13]. See Figure (10). 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Sequence diagram of general scanners approach to detect XSS. 
 
 
Figure 10. DexterJS approach to detect DOM-XSS [13]. 
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DOMinator 
DOMinator uses dynamic taint-tracking to detect DOM-XSS by instrumenting Firefox’s 
SpiderMonkey javascript engine. It has a function that tracks the execution history of tainted 
input until it reaches its sink and stores this tracking data so that exploit module can alter 
these data and follow the same path to validate if it was vulnerable [14]. 
Flax 
Flax uses more dynamic approach called taint enhanced black-box fuzzing which combines 
dynamic taint analysis with automated random fuzzing. The dynamic taint analysis part of 
the tool identifies all uses of untrusted data in critical sink then automated random fuzzing 
is responsible to find an input that can cause DOM-XSS [15]. See Figure (11). 
 
Xenotix 
OWASP Xenotix XSS Exploit Framework is both a scanner and exploit tool. The tool also 
has a module to specifically detect DOM-XSS that uses taint tracking to analyse scripts in 
the page and identify used sources and sinks that might cause DOM-XSS [16]. 
The last academic tool is developed by Sebastian Lekies, Ben Stock and Martin Johns. The 
tool is browser-integrated one that consists of two separate components which are modified 
browsing engine and automated vulnerability validation mechanism. The modified brows-
ing engine allows the tool to do dynamic byte-level taint-tracking of suspicious flows. The 
automated vulnerability validation mechanism processes the information provided by the 
browsing engine and create attack payload that could exploit existing DOM-XSS vulnera-
bility [17].  
On the other hand, Acunetix which is one of the most popular commercial web scanners 
defines its approach to detect DOM-XSS by using “DeepScan technology” [18] which al-
lows it to trace script execution cycle and monitor page source that the script uses until it 
reaches single or various sinks. That approach is more like dynamic taint-tracking that was 
used by previous academic tool. 
 
 
Figure 11. Flax approach to detect DOM-XSS [15]. 
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3 Methodology 
In this section, the author will explain this thesis alternative approach to detect DOM-XSS 
and the benefit of using it over other academic or commercial approaches mentioned in the 
related work section. 
There are couple of challenges that face the automation process to fully detect cross-site 
scripting vulnerabilities. As mentioned in the background section, web scanners detect 
cross-site scripting vulnerabilities by detecting all inputs in the webpage then identify which 
of these inputs data is reflected in the received response from web server by injecting unique 
malicious payload in inputs and analyse the response for cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. 
This approach can effectively detect server reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. But 
it will fail to detect some cases of stored cross-site scripting vulnerabilities as well as DOM-
XSS in general. For an example of missed cases of stored XSS: when the form submission 
doesn’t direct to the page where it contains the injected payload but it directs to an interme-
diate page that contains status of form submission or page with another form, the scanner 
will fail to detect the vulnerability. It will also fail to detect any DOM-XSS vulnerabilities 
due to the fact that injected data appears only in the rendered response. These issues are one 
of the most challenges facing automation of detecting XSS. The thesis methodology con-
centrate in automating detection of DOM-XSS. 
As mentioned in related work section, the previous work on detecting DOM-XSS concen-
trates on analysing the scripts behaviour in the page to detect if any unsafe user input was 
injected into page dynamic content by either using taint-tracking or dynamic taint-tracking. 
This is done by (static or dynamic) monitoring of variables and functions that access page 
resources which contains user strings and trace their execution until they reach a single or 
multiple sinks. This approach leads to have a separate tool or module that specifically made 
for DOM-XSS analysis which was only adopted commercially by Acunetix. The approach 
also might fail sometimes to detect vulnerabilities with big complicated javascript libraries 
and even use different ways of accessing page resources and output these resources to page 
dynamic content. 
This thesis proposes an alternative approach in detecting cross-site scripting vulnerabilities 
which is to add a layer in the scanner that can render all received responses before analysing 
them for injected payload. To add such a layer the scanner needs to have either a built-in 
browser or to open and control a browser in order to be able to render the received HTML 
response. Adding such layer will execute any scripts in the page and also could be used to 
confirm if the injection successfully exploited XSS vulnerability or not, hence decreasing 
false positive to zero. The approach also facilitate integrating the tool with any general web 
scanner giving it the ability to detect DOM-XSS and validate any vulnerability through an 
actual browser.  
To provide a proof of concept that this methodology is both applicable and can successfully 
detect DOM-XSS vulnerabilities, the thesis author developed a tool that is able to open, 
control a web browser and fill inputs found in the loaded webpage. To achieve that there are 
two ways. The first one is to create a built-in browser from scratch using web views or 
something similar which would allow the developed tool to fully control it, but it would 
end-up being different than modern web browsers that users actually use, as each browser 
has a certain way in parsing and rendering received HTML. Even some browsers like 
Chrome have special built-in plugins to detect XSS called XSS-auditor [19]. Also Firefox 
automatically encodes certain meta-character in URL by default. 
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That leads to the second option where the designed tool would use a third party tool to 
communicate with an actual browser. There are unit testing libraries and tools that were 
developed to allow web developers to write test cases to test their website’s functionality. 
One of these tools, Selenium [20], gives the full power of opening an actual web browser 
and gives total control of opening web pages, filling input fields in the page and even check-
ing if any pop-up alerts were triggered by the webpage. Web developers use Selenium to 
write test scripts that will open an actual web browser using its correspondent web driver 
and follow a test case scenario to check their website functionality. The author’s developed 
tool will use Selenium to open and control an actual web browsers which allows the tool to 
have the option of running scan in multiple different browsers.  
The tool will use Selenium to open a browser which returns a web driver object that allows 
the tool to control the browser. Then the tool loads the URL that needs scanning into the 
browser. The browser communicates with the webserver by sending an HTTP request and 
wait for the HTML in the response to render it. Once rendering is done, it send the rendered 
code to the tool. The tool detect all possible input within the rendered response including 
inputs inside forms and outside forms as well as URL parameters. Then it injects unique 
 
Figure 12. Sequence of detecting possible vulnerable inputs in a webpage by thesis tool. 
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payload in each input in the form and submit a form request. The browser will take care of 
submitting the request which will send HTTP request that contains the injected payloads 
and then received the response. The browser once again render the response and send it to 
the tool which checks which of the inputs data were reflected in it. See Figure (12). 
At this point the tool has list of all possible vulnerable inputs in the webpage. The next step 
is to check if the website encode/filter injected data in these inputs which could be done by 
re-injecting payload along with specific characters/words that are needed to inject malicious 
code that would cause cross-site scripting vulnerability. The browser takes care of sending 
a request to web server and send back the rendered response to the tool. The tool crafts a list 
of possible payloads that could be injected in each input based on the position of the data 
reflected in the response and the filters identified for that input. Then it injects each payload 
for the input separately and the browser takes care once more of submitting forms with the 
 
Figure 13. Sequence diagram showing how thesis tool injects malicious payload and 
confirms its execution. 
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malicious payload and send back the rendered response to the tool. The tool checks if each 
payload manage to pop-up an alert box or not. Finally the tool generates a report that con-
tains scan results including possible vulnerable inputs, vulnerability found, payload used 
and scan metrics like number of request sent and scan duration. See Figure (13). 
The drawback of using Selenium is that it still has some compatibility issues [21] which 
makes it so that Selenium only runs specific versions of web browsers that are both com-
patible with the its version and the version of the web driver that it user to control the 
browser. For the tool to run a scan it will open a browser and keep loading the scan target 
webpage while populating its input with different payloads then tries to check if the injected 
payload gets executed or not. Due to these issues and the noise that would be generated by 
the tool while running scan, the thesis author decided to make the tool a web-based one. 
Where users can just submit scan requests with the desired webpages and do not have to 
worry about any compatibility issues, complicated installation steps or system noise gener-
ated by the scan.  
Having the developed scanner as a web-based tool will add some overhead issues that need 
special handling like adding authentication in order to attribute each scan to an actual logged 
in user, since the attack will be generated from the website server. Also adding authentica-
tion to a website will require using SSL communication to secure user credentials. Imple-
menting database in order to save user account details as well as scan results done by each 
user. Since the attacks is generated from the tool web server, it is not enough to attribute 
scans to specific account so the author uses domain control validation (DCV) to confirm the 
user ownership of the domain. Domain control validation is done by asking the user to up-
load an empty file with unique name to the domain root, hence confirm ownership of the 
domain. Finally since the scan will probably takes long time to finish (more than 2 seconds 
at least), scan requests should be pushed to a queue and handled one at a time. 
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4 Implementation: 
The previous section explained the methodology of this thesis and why the proof of concept 
tool that detects DOM-XSS will be web-based one. This section will explain implementa-
tion of the tool from setting up the server, identifying all the used tools, plugins or libraries 
and implementing the XSS attack process. 
4.1 Server setup 
The tool is hosted in DigitalOcean [22] VPS under the domain (http//:alert1.me). Due to 
budget restraints the web server has the minimum technical specifications that are sufficient 
enough to run the tool which are: 
 4GB memory/2CPU. 
 20GB disk. 
 OS: Ubuntu 16.04.1 x64. 
There are set of tools that needs to be installed on the VPS in order to be able to implement 
the tool. We will mention these applications and their use, but will not go in details of the 
installation and configuration steps since it would be out of thesis scope. The needed tools 
are as shown in Table (1). 
Table 1:  Required tools on the VPS for the thesis tool. 
Tool  Usage  
Apache2 v2.4.18 To be used as the tool web-server 
MySQL v14.14 To be used as the database server for storing user ac-
count details and any scan data. 
Postfix v3.1.0 [23] To serve as SMTP server to allow sending account 
confirmation emails as well as add the possibility of 
sending notifications e-mail after scan is done. 
Python v3.5.2 To be used as the main programming language for the 
tool. 
Python-BeautifulSoup v4.4.1[24] To help parsing HTML. 
Django [25] v1.10.1 To be used as the web development framework. 
Django-rq [26]v0.9.2 To queue scan request. 
Django-Redis [27] v4.4.4 Cache server used to push scan requests to queue. 
Selenium v2.53.6 To open and control web browsers using their corre-
spondent web driver. 
Chromium [28] v51.0.2704.79 To be used as an alternative browser. 
Firefox v48 To be used as the main testing web browser. 
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PyVirtualDisplay v0.2 [29] Python wrapper for XVFB [30] which is an X server 
that can run on machines with no display. It will allow 
us to run browsers heedlessly in Ubuntu server. 
Docker 1.12.1 To act as a container for Selenium node. 
4.2 Database design 
In this section the author will design the database tables and their attributes to store any data 
processed by the website or the tool. Starting with the set of tables needed to account au-
thentications which will be automatically generated by Django [31] and the author will not 
explain these tables or their attributes as they are out of scope. On the other hand, the website 
need tables to store scan details and generated reports. 
The EER diagram of database is shown below in Figure (14). Although auth_user table 
belongs to the tables automatically generated by Django but it was left in the diagram since 
the scan table will use the primary key of the auth_user table (ID) as a foreign key. The 
attacks_scan table saves records of different domains that the user scanned. Records on that 
table are unique by design as there should be no duplicate domain that belongs to the same 
user. The tables have the following attributes:“id“, “domain“ to save domain URL, “token“ 
to save confirmation token of the domain, “time_added“ to save the time when scan was 
added, “spider“ if true tool will run spider web scan on the domain after domain ownership 
is confirmed and finally “user_id“ which is foreign key of the auth_user table. 
For each domain entered by the user to scan, there might be list of pages at this domain. The 
tool allows manual adding of pages or doing web spider scan to detect all possible pages 
and then run scan on them. For every new page added by a user, the tool should check the 
record of the domain and create a new record of the page table that corresponds to its do-
main. As the attacks_scan primary key is a foreign key in the attacks_page table. The at-
tacks_page table has the following attributes: :“id“, “page_url“, “time_added“, 
“time_scan_started“, “time_scan_ended“, “domain_id“ as foreign key of table scan to con-
nect pages to domains and finally “scan_status“ which is either in queue, processing or 
scanned. 
Finally, to save reports of the scan for each page, we created table attacks_reports. The 
attacks_page primary key is a foreign key in the attacks_report table which means that every 
record of a report corresponds to a record in attacks_page which in turn corresponds to a 
record in table attacks_scan that corresponds to a specific user. The attacks_report table has 
the following attributes: “number_request“, “scan_duration“, “vulnerability_found“ and 
“crafted_payload“. Also, it has attributes that relates to scan result like: “hash_access“, 
“url_parameters“ and “page_input“. These attributes provide information on possible injec-
tion point that can help penetration testers to fasten their testing process. 
4.3 Site map 
The website developed has simple structure. Starting with the landing page that gives a 
quick brief about cross-site scripting vulnerabilities and how scanners detect them specially 
DOM-XSS. Then it explains that the tool is an academic one that proposes an alternative 
approach in detecting DOM-XSS. The scan page is where user can add URL so that the tool 
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can scan them. Contact details page contains the details of the thesis author in order to con-
tact him for any future collaboration. Finally all the web pages that are necessary for account 
authentication like signup, login, forgot password and reset password. 
4.4 Scan process 
Scan process is the process that handles scan requests by the user before the actual tool run 
any scan. It starts with dealing with the user request to initiate new scan and explains all the 
possible scenarios for user interaction with the web-tool. On the other hand the process also 
includes how the server deal with scan request and all the possible scenarios to handle it.  
 
Figure 14. Database EER diagram. 
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We will explain first user interaction with the web-tool to initiate new scan. As shown in 
Figure (15), when a user opens the scan page to initiate a scan, there will be three options to 
choose from: first single page scan where user can add single URL for the tool to scan then 
domain scan where user can provide top domain URL and then server will run web spider 
scan to find all the possible pages that are linked to that top level domain; finally URLs from 
file where a user can add a file that contains list of URLs where each URL is in a separate 
line. 
When user initiates a scan process using one of the previously mentioned options it sends 
scan request to server which will handle the request based on the URL submitted. For any 
submitted URL there are three possible cases. First the domain is new one where domain in 
the submitted URL is new and user will be asked to confirm domain control validation 
(DCV) by uploading HTML page with uniquely random generated name that was provided 
by the tool to his domain root. See Figure (16). This allows only the domain owner to run 
scan on their websites since the scan requests will be sent from the tool web server.  
The other case is that the domain exists already in the database for that logged in user and 
that domain ownership is confirmed. In that case, if the URL is new, a new page record will 
be created that belongs to that domain and then it will be added to scan queue. Otherwise, 
if the URL exists in the database and not in the scan queue, it will be added to scan queue. 
See Figure (17). 
 
Figure 15. Scan options available to user. 
 
 
Figure 16. Result of adding URL with new domain. 
 
 
Figure 17. Result of adding URL with previously confirmed domain. 
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Finally if the domain also exists in the database and is not confirmed then the URL will be 
processed the same way as in existing confirmed domain, but it will not be added to queue. 
Or in case of domain scan the domain record attribute “spider” will be set to true. 
For the third option found in the scan page where user can add multiple URLs from a file, 
each URL will be considered as separate scan entry; hence will have one of the previously 
mentioned cases. 
For a user to confirm domain ownership, he should create an empty file with the unique 
generated file name in the domain root. After that on the tool scan page, he should click on 
the confirm button under that domain which will send a confirmation request to the backend 
where it will check if the file exists by sending HTTP Request and checks if the HTTP 
response equals 200. After domain confirmation, all pages that correspond to that domain 
will be added to scan queue and if the domain attributes spider is set to true, it will run web 
spider scan to detect all pages linked to the top level domains. 
User can check each page scan status under the domain as there are three options: “In queue” 
when page is in queue to get scanned, “processing” when scan process for the page is ongo-
ing or “done” where scan is done and reports were successfully generated. 
On the other hand, when the server receives a scan request, first the request needs to be 
validated to avoid any crafted or altered request and ensure server security then it pass the 
request data to scan function. 
As shown in Figure (18), the scan request is considered valid if it was of type POST which 
was just a design decision. The request should also be sent from a logged-in user which is 
handled by Django itself. Then it checks if the request has log-in cookie maps to an existing 
login session. 
Scan request has two parameters which are “URL“ and “type“. As shown in Figure (19), 
request parameters are considered valid if the submitted URL is valid which is confirmed 
by checking it against URL regular expression found in Django’s URL validator [32]. Then 
it checks if the URL exists by sending a GET request and checks if the response code is 200 
and finally if the type parameter value is either 0, 1 or 2 which corresponds to single URL, 
domain and file scan type respectively.  
 
 
Figure 18. Scan request validation. 
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If any of the request parameters are not valid, request will be discarded. After the request 
and its parameters are validated, the request parameters are passed to add scan function to 
process it. The add scan process decides the correct scenario for processing scan URL. As 
shown in Figure (20) below, the process starts by checking if the domain exists in user’s 
domain records. If not, it adds new domain record that is linked to that user and then creates 
new page record that is linked to that domain. 
 
Figure 19. Request parameter validation. 
 
Figure 20. Add scan process. 
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If the domain already exists for that user, then it checks if the domain was confirmed or not. 
If it was confirmed and there is not page record with that URL, then it adds new page record 
and add it to scan queue. On the other hand if page exists, it checks that page status. If it is 
not in queue or in scan, it means that user was re-scanning an existing page. In that case, it 
adds that page record to scan queue. But if the page status shows it is in queue or already 
getting scanned, then the request will be discarded. 
If the domain exists and was not confirmed then it checks if the added URL was in the 
domain’s page records or not. If the page exists already then request is discarded, otherwise 
a new page record for that domain is created. 
The scan queue was implemented by using Redis cache server and Django-rq which enables 
to push function calls from Django that gets queued and executed by the Django-rq process. 
That approach handles the long time needed by the attack process by pushing all scan re-
quest to queue and update scan status and results once they are ready. 
Figure (21) shows how Django pushes page’s record URL and its ID to scan queue and also 
update the scan status of that record to ‘In queue’. On the other hand Figure (22) shows how 
Django-rq process pops-up jobs from the queue. First, it updates the scan status for that page 
record to ‘processing’. Then it initiate the scan by calling the attack sequence function. Once 
scan is done, the page record status is updated to ‘scanned’. Then the process checks if there 
were more jobs in the queue. The maximum work time for any job popped from queue is 
600 seconds which is long enough for any scan to finish. 
Scan process is also responsible on running the crawler in order to scan top level domain 
for URLs. Since crawler process can consume long time, it was also done using queue. The 
crawler returns list of found URL which is then processed to check if each URL exists before 
 
Figure 21. Function that add pages to scan queue 
 
Figure 22. Job that pops-up scan request from the queue and calls attack function. 
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in the database for the user requested the scan. Then it adds the URL to queue only if the 
URL was not already in queue. See Figure (23).  
4.5 Attack process: 
In the previous steps a URL that needs scanning was validated, attributed to a certain user 
who confirmed ownership of his domain and finally pushed to scan queue. In this section, 
steps for attack URL will be explain in details. The attack process receives the URL that 
needs scanning then it follows the steps defined previously in methodology section to detect 
XSS which are: identify possible inputs in page, properly inject unique payload into it, check 
which of these input reflect data on the page, analyse reflection case, identify existing filter, 
craft payload based on previous data, inject that crafted payload and finally check if the 
injected code was executed.  
In order to have a modular efficient code, we reversed the implementation process by split-
ting the full task into smaller ones then code each task separately. This approach was used 
to facilitate constant editing during thesis implementation and to ensure that more features 
can easily be added in the future. In the following sections we will explain functions and 
classes created for each small task and in the end we will explain how they are integrated 
together to create the attack process. 
Initialization  
The first step in developing the attack process was to create a class that initializes global 
variables which will be used during the whole process. Initializing the class takes the page 
ID in order to load the database record of the page to allow updating scan status and create 
reports. The class also sets up a virtual display so that browser can run in it and finally opens 
a browser by creating an instance of Selenium’s web driver that allow us to control the 
browser. See Figure (24). 
 
Figure 23. Job that pops-up web spider requests from queue and handles results. 
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Detect inputs 
In this part, we will also create a class that has functions for detecting page inputs and at-
tributes that hold input detection results. That allows an object of that class to have attributes 
with the input detection results.  
As shown in Figure (25), the class objects are initialized with two parameter: URL and the 
object of global environment class. The initialize function starts with detecting parameters 
found in the URL and save them in class attribute named ’parameterURL’ as a dictionary 
where the URL parameter name is the key. Then it checks if there was hash (#) in the URL 
and save the result to a class attribute of type bool. It also detects inputs in the page by first 
opening the page and rendering the response, parse that response by BeautifulSoup to facil-
itate pulling inputs from the page source then find all the forms in that response and save 
them. Finally to detect any inputs that are not inside form tags, it will first remove all the 
forms found from the rendered source then look for any input tag and save them to a list. 
 
Figure 25. Input detection class. 
 
Figure 24. Environment setup class 
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Check reflection 
To check reflection the code needs to inject unique token that might not be found in the 
rendered response. The token generates random 25 digit of hex values (UUID) which ensure 
token uniqueness [33] as it is used to generate unique file name for the user to confirm the 
domain ownership as well as unique payload in testing reflection. See Figure (26) 
After sending a request with the unique generated token, the rendered response needs to be 
checked to confirm if the token was reflected or not. As shown in Figure (27), function 
‘tokenReflection’ takes the token and rendered page source as its parameters and then parses 
all the reflection occurrences of the token using regular expressions [34]. The expression 
detects what you might call reflection string which is the first HTML tag surrounding the 
token. So if the token was part of a tag attribute like <img src=“token“>, it will parse the 
whole image tag. But if it was between two tags like <p>token</>, then it will parse the 
opening and closing paragraph tag and save it as reflection string. Then it passes each re-
flection string as well as the injected token to ‘detectTokenCase’ function which returns 
value that represent the reflection case based on the position of the token in the HTML. 
There are three possible cases for a token to appear in HTML. First case (case 0) where the 
token is inside HTML tag like <img src=“token“>. Second case (case 1) where the token is 
between two HTML tags like <p>token</p>. Third case (case 2) where token is inside script 
tags like <script> token </script>. Finally the function add both reflection string and token 
case into a dictionary with reflection string as a key then return that dictionary. 
  
Figure 26. Token generator funciton. 
 
Figure 27. Token reflection detection 
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Identify filters 
At this point, the tool managed to identify the possible vulnerable inputs that their data gets 
reflected in the rendered response and needs to check if there was any encoding or filtering 
that gets applied on injected data.  
There are three functions that helps in identifying possible filters on characters for each 
reflection string found in the rendered response. The first function identifies character 
needed to inject XSS payload that could exploit that specific reflection based on the reflec-
tion case. The thesis author identified two main meta-character that are used to escape the 
reflected string if the reflection case is of type 0 where the token is inside an attribute of 
HTML tag. In that case double quotes (") and single quote (') are the only way to escape the 
string and inject a malicious code. On the other hand if the reflection was of case 1 where 
the reflected token is just text inside the tag then less-than sign (<) and greater-than sign (>) 
are the only way to inject malicious code. If the reflection case is of case 2, then all of the 
four character might be needed to craft a payload depending on the scenario.  
The second function takes the full reflection dictionary and return list of all the characters 
that need to be checked by the attack function in order to craft load. The function mainly 
loop through the dictionary and then uses the first function to decide which character is 
needed for each reflection. These two functions were split since only the first one will be 
needed while crafting the payload. 
The third function takes the reflection dictionary, token, filter dictionary and the character 
that is being tested to check whether the website filter it or not. The function checks if the 
character injected after the token was reflected directly, encoded, escaped or any other sce-
narios. 
First, the function creates a sub-dictionary for each reflection string to add filter cases of 
characters for each reflection string. Then it checks whether the token was followed directly 
by the character. In that case it adds an entry in the filter dictionary for that reflection string 
with the character being tested as a key and with value 0. On the other hand to check if the 
character was encoded, it encodes the character and checks if that encoding exists after the 
token which makes value added in the dictionary for the character of the reflection string 
equal 1. If the website injects reverse solidus (commonly known as backslash) before the 
injected character, then the value will be 2 in that case. Otherwise it injects a value of 3 to 
the filtered dictionary with keys reflection string and character which indicates unknown 
case which might include total filtering of the character or double encoding, etc. See Figure 
(28). 
Craft payload 
At this point the tool has already identified possible vulnerable inputs, dictionary of reflec-
tion strings with their reflection case type and filters for each occurrence of data reflection 
in the rendered response. All that data will be used to craft possible payloads that should be 
able to inject code that gets executed. In this version of the thesis the payload will mainly 
concentrate on popping up an alert box.  
The craft payload function takes three arguments: the reflected dictionary which has all the 
reflection string mapped to their reflection case, the injected token and filter dictionary 
which has list of sub-dictionaries that has the value of filter case for each reflection string. 
The function is not that sophisticated at the moment of writing the thesis as it does not craft 
specific payload for the HTML tag itself but uses three of the most popular events among 
HTML tags which are on error, on load and on focus as it also passes the auto-focus attribute. 
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The last attribute found in the payload which is ‘x=none’ is just a dummy attribute that will 
get ignored by most browser as the rest of the tag would still have closing single or double 
quotation. If the dummy attribute was not added the browser would discard the injected 
event itself. See Figure (29). 
At this point, the craft payload function also focuses on crafting payloads for cases 0 and 1 
which are when token is inside HTML tag as an attribute or between two HTML tags re-
spectively.  
Check injection 
Check injection function takes the object from environment class which contains the web 
driver object that control the website. Then it uses wait function that is implemented in web 
driver which waits until an event in the browser happens which in our case is an alert box. 
If the alert box was found then it accepts it and returns true. If it was not found or any 
exception occurs then it returns false. See Figure (30). 
 
 
Figure 28. Identify filter functions. 
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 Main attack function 
The main attack function initializes an object of the environment setup class. Then loads the 
URL in the browser to update the URL value. As in some cases the server would automati-
cally add parameters to the before sending back the response to browser. Then it detects 
page inputs by creating an object of page input class with page’s URL that needs scanning. 
It splits the attack process into three different attacks that target three different types of 
inputs in the page: hash, URL parameters and rest of the page inputs. See Figure (31). 
Hash attack  
In this section the environment variables were initialized and the tool tries to check if the 
hash value reflects in the rendered response or not. It starts by injecting a token in the hash 
URL. Then open the webpage and check if the token was reflected by calling the token 
Figure 30. Check injection function. 
 
Figure 29. Craft payload function. 
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reflection function.  If there were reflection cases, then it identifies all characters that would 
be needed to carry out an XSS attack by calling ‘identifyXSSChars’ function. Then it injects 
each of the character after the token and pass the rendered response to ‘identifyFilterCase’ 
function which creates dictionary of sub-dictionaries to all the character filter cases based 
on each reflection string found in reflection dictionary. The craft payload function uses all 
this data to craft a list of payload as mentioned in the previous section.  
URL parameters attack 
The function injects token in each parameter found in the URL then follows the same pro-
cedure found in the hash attack function by checking reflection list for each injected token 
and craft list of payload for each parameter. Then it checks if any of these injections man-
aged to pop-up an alert box successfully. See Figure (32). 
Page inputs attack 
It checks each form found in the page and detect all possible input inside it and then it injects 
unique input for each one of them. The function checks every form separately in order to 
guarantee that the form will be submitted correctly. This part of the tool is still under devel-
opment as fuzzing and submitting forms are more complicated; as some forms might have 
lots of restriction on input type or even have CAPTCHA to check if the form was submitted 
by human and protect website against bot attacks. 
  
 
Figure 31. Main attack function. 
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Figure 32. URL parameters attack function 
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5 Test Cases: 
In this section the author sets up some test cases which have DOM-XSS in order to validate 
the approach followed by this thesis to detect DOM-XSS vulnerabilities. The cases were 
chosen from either online DOM-XSS challenges or based on common developer’s ap-
proaches in developing websites that cause DOM-XSS. The cases covers possible scenarios 
for reflected DOM-XSS. Since developer’s approaches are identified based on the develop-
ing experience of the thesis author, he used snippets of public code found on popular devel-
opment community forums.  
5.1 Case 1: 
The first case is taken from the 3rd XSS challenge created by Google [35] which addresses 
the fact that data after fragment identifier (commonly known as URL hash, #) are not passed 
in the request URL to server but only processed at the client side. Usually URL hash is used 
to access elements in the page using their ID or sometimes to pass data within the page while 
preventing the page from reloading. In the challenge, when user change tabs, the anchor tag 
adds the correspondent tab number after the hash in the URL. Then there is a script function 
in the page that monitors tab changes and parses data found in the URL hash and uses it as 
a part of the source attribute of an image tag and then injects that image in the page dynamic 
content. See Figure (33).  
Figure (34) shows that the HTML from the received response does not have any image tags 
inside the tab content div. The image tag is injected only when the browser render that re-
sponse. As on window load event the script parse the tab number found after the URL hash 
and send it to choose tab function. If the URL does not have any hash data, it will send 1 by 
default. Choosing tab function takes that tab number and use it as part of the source of an 
image tag. The script does not encode data in the URL hash, which allow crafted data in the 
URL hash to be injected as part of source attribute inside image tag. This allows hacker to 
inject malicious string that starts with a single quote that can escape the string of source 
attribute then add another attribute like (onerror) and inject malicious javascript within that 
attribute value that will get executed when rendering the image fails due to wrong source 
 
Figure 33. 3rd XSS challenge by Google. 
34 
 
value. Figure (35) shows an example of a malicious crafted link by a hacker for the first case 
that will pop-up an alert box once the victim clicks on it. 
The webpage for that case can be found at- https://xss-game.appspot.com/level3/frame#1 
 
Figure 34. HTML of 3rd XSS challenge by Google. 
 
Figure 35. Exploit of 3rd XSS challenge by Google. 
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5.2 Case 2: 
The second case addresses the approach of passing data to front-end through URL parame-
ters. The HTML response contains scripts that parse these data and form the webpage based 
on it. When browser load the web page it renders the HTML response causing page scripts 
to be executed which will then parse data found in the URL and inject it somehow inside 
the page dynamic content. If parse data is not properly code, hacker can inject malicious 
script that will then be executed by the browser as a legitimate page scripts. 
The case scenario is a web page that shows profile data of the logged-in user. The server 
passes user ID as URL parameter. As some websites save user profile pictures with their ID 
(‘/images/<userID>.jpg). The page has script that takes the parse URL parameter then use 
that data to form the image source attribute as the first case. See Figure (36). 
That approach of passing values through URL parameters and that specific scenario of load-
ing profile picture based on the passed data can be found in multiple websites whether it is 
done on the backend or frontend. 
In Figure (37), the function that parses the URL parameter was taken from an answer on 
Stackoverflow [36] with 5440 vote as the thesis was written, which makes that code a very 
popular one that might have been used by thousands of developers on different websites. 
The problem with that snippet of code is that it misses doing proper encoding and that not 
every developer who will use the function understands that data returned by that function 
still needs proper encoding or it will cause security vulnerability. 
The other part of the problem that is causing the XSS vulnerability is adding that data to 
page using HTML function in JQuery [37] or innerHTML in javascript [38] without doing 
proper encoding. There are multiple of resources including Stackoverflow [39] and others 
[40] offering that solution to developer without explaining possible security risks behind it.  
Figure (38) shows an example of a malicious crafted link by a hacker for the first case that 
will pop-up an alert box once the victim click on it. 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Case 2 scenario. 
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The webpage for that case can be found at- http://alert1.me/vuln/profile.html?ac-
cName=qwe&accID=6133efa5fb5e4207a3d0649ffa6f5b86  
5.3  Case 3  
In this case, data will be passed through URL parameter like in case 2. But once the browser 
loads the page, these data will be sent back to server again through an ajax [41] request. The 
web server will reply to that request with a json response [42]. Then the page script will 
somehow process that response and injects part of the data into the page dynamic content. 
Such an approach is being widely used in modern websites in order to minimize page load-
ing time and increase performance of the website. As this approached introduced page dy-
namic loading where the developers do not have to send back all data requested by user but 
split them into chunks and load them on request. This approach is user in social network 
 
Figure 37. Case 2 HTML response. 
 
Figure 38. Exploit of Case 2 scenario. 
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website to load posts in a web page, as loading all the posts at once will take long time and 
will probably crash the browser. 
In our case, there is a search bar that allows user to search for keywords in the website. 
When a user searches for a keyword the form will send GET request which adds the keyword 
to a URL parameter. Then after the browser loads that page, script in the page will parse the 
URL parameter and send that data as an ajax request to backend. The backend will search 
database for that keyword and send back search results to frontend. Then frontend scripts 
will add the search results to the page dynamic content. If all these previous steps do not 
properly encode data parsed from URL parameter, there will be a DOM-XSS vulnerability. 
See Figure (39). 
In this case, the author used the same function from case 2 to parse the search URL param-
eter. The page script sends an ajax request that include the search parameter using JQuery 
and then populate the page with the results received from the server of that request. All these 
steps do not do any proper encoding of the data entered by the user. See Figure (40) for the 
case code. On the other hand, Figure (41) shows an example of a malicious crafted link by 
a hacker for the third case that will pop-up an alert box once the victim click on it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39. Case 3 scenario. 
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The webpage for that case can be found at- http://alert1.me/v1?search=test   
 
Figure 40. Case 3 code. 
 
Figure 41. Exploit of Case 3 scenario. 
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6 Results 
In this section, the author scans the previously mentioned test cases by the tool as well as 
different web scanners. Then he compares the results of each test cases from different scan-
ners. The comparison metrics will be vulnerability detection (true positive – TP), false de-
tection (false positive - FP), scan duration and number of request sent during the scan pro-
cess. 
Although test cases might not cover every possible scenarios that causes DOM-XSS vulner-
abilities, but they cover wide range of possible reflected DOM-XSS scenarios that can proof 
that the tool could detect the vulnerability. 
In order for that comparison to be correct, the scanners needed to be picked carefully and to 
specific criteria. As there is a big list of general web scanners that scans for different web 
vulnerabilities as well as lots of academic and experimental scanners. So the first criteria of 
choosing the scanner is that it has XSS detection profile or capability. Next, the scanner’s 
licence should be either open-source, free to use or at least has a trial period in case of 
commercial scanners. At this point there were still lots of scanners to be considered, so the 
author tried to favour the most recommended ones recognized by OWASP [43]. 
The tool results was compared against 2 scanners that has modules for DOM-XSS detection: 
OWASP Xenotix XSS exploit framework and Acunetix which both use taint-tracking and 
dynamic taint-tracking respectively. Comparison also includes another 2 scanner that use 
the generic method of only analysing the received HTML response: W3af and Vega.  
Results of scanning Case 1  
Table 2. Result of scanning case 1 by different web scanners. 
Scanner name Vulnerability 
found (TP) 
False vulnerabilities 
(FP) 
Scan duration 
(seconds) 
# requests 
Thesis tool (X55) 1 0 97 19 
Acunetix WVS 1 0 265 41 
Xenotix 1 0 17 N/A 
Vega  0 0 47 23 
W3af 0 0 45 N/A 
Results of scanning Case 2 
Table 3. Result of scanning case 2 by different web scanners. 
Scanner name Vulnerability 
found (TP) 
False vulnerabilities 
(FP) 
Scan duration # requests 
Thesis tool (X55) 1 0 145 17 
Acunetix WVS 0 0 65 96 
Xenotix 1 0 12 N/A 
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Vega  0 0 65 34 
W3af 0 0 73 N/A 
Results of scanning Case 3 
Table 4. Result of scanning case 3 by different web scanners. 
Scanner name Vulnerability 
found (TP) 
False vulnerabilities 
(FP) 
Scan duration 
(seconds) 
# requests 
Thesis tool (X55) 1 0 169 33 
Acunetix WVS 0 0 38 88 
Xenotix 0 0 13 N/A 
Vega  0 0 57 76 
W3af 0 0 45 N/A 
The tool results show that it consumes more time than other tools but it was successful to 
find the DOM-XSS vulnerability. The consumed time is expected due to the overhead 
needed to open a browser and time of loading the webpage itself. Time consuming could 
be an arguable metrics against the value of finding the bug itself in an approach that could 
be integrated in any web scanner. In conclusion, the results prove that the methodology 
could successfully detect DOM-XSS vulnerability. 
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7 Summary 
In this section, the thesis author drew conclusions based on the results of scanning test cases 
with different web scanners and the tool developed by the thesis author. The author also 
discussed importance of developing such tool with different penetration testers and defined 
possible valuable information that would help them to carry-out manual tests. Also, the au-
thor defines possible future work that could enhance the tool detection for XSS vulnerabil-
ities. 
7.1 Conclusion 
This thesis proposes an alternative methodology to automate detection of DOM cross-site 
scripting vulnerabilities by adding an extra layer between receiving the HTML code from 
the server response and analysing it for vulnerabilities. The layer is an actual browser that 
renders the received HTML response. Rendering the response allows the execution of any 
scripts in the page which can change content of the page and might cause DOM-XSS vul-
nerabilities. Then the tool scans that rendered response for possible cross-site scripting vul-
nerabilities. Since the tool’s methodology is a build-up on the methodology followed by 
general web scanners to detect XSS, it can be integrated in any web scanners allowing them 
to effectively discover all kind of cross-site scripting.  
The author developed a web-based tool based on the proposed methodology to proof that it 
is a practical one. He also created 3 scenarios that cover wide range of possible reflected 
DOM-XSS scenarios. Test cases were based on either online hacking challenges that con-
tained DOM-XSS vulnerabilities or popular code found on developer’s community forums. 
The author compared results from scanning these 3 test cases by the tool as well as other 
web scanners. The results showed that the tool is capable of finding reflected DOM-XSS 
against the other tools. The drawback of the tool is that it consumes time due to the actual 
fact that it has to open an actual browser and load pages through it. 
Finally, this thesis methodology could contribute to enhance general web scanners to allow 
them discover all kind of XSS including DOM without the need to run dynamic taint scan 
on the page’s scripts. It also contributes a tool that can detect reflective DOM-XSS vulner-
abilities and have successfully claimed bounty from TransferWise for DOM-XSS vulnera-
bility found in their website through their un-official bug bounty program. 
7.2 Future work 
Since the developed tool by the thesis author was meant as a proof of concept of the followed 
methodology, the tool needs more future developing contribution in the following criteria.  
Crafting payload 
The craft payload function generates proper list of payloads based on the position of the 
reflected token in the rendered response and list of filtered/encoded characters/words de-
tected by the tool. The function needs more work to cover more possible scenarios and com-
bination of HTML tags along with their possible attributes as well as the filtered/encoded 
characters/words. 
Confirm injection 
The craft payload function creates a list of payload that try to launch an alert box as a proof 
of concept of XSS vulnerability. Such an approach might not always work as some XSS 
firewall or filters might detect the alert keyword and deny the request. Future work could 
concentrate on different approaches of confirming that injection was successful by using 
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other resources accessible by script like using “console.log () “which output string or object 
to browser’s console. 
Different browsers 
The tool uses an actual browser to render the web page which allows any script in the page 
to be executed. At the moment, the tool uses only Chromium browser, which served well as 
a proof of concept. But future work should include using different browsers to scan the page 
and give detailed results of the scan on each browser. Because certain payloads might not 
work in specific browsers as some browsers have XSS detection plugin like XSS auditor in 
Chrome, XSS filter in Microsoft Edge or even in Firefox which encodes the URL by default. 
Fuzzing forms 
Checking forms in page and fuzzing them with data to check if their fields are vulnerable is 
still under development. Form submission is an actual hard process as most forms in real 
websites would have constrains on some field whether only digits or letters or specific for-
mat. Also, they might have CAPTCHA to challenge bots submissions which makes it even 
more complicated process. 
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Appendix 
I. Abbreviation 
URL Uniform Resource Locator 
HTML Hypertext Markup Language 
XSS Cross-site scripting 
DOM Document object model 
CSSOM Cascaded Style Sheet Object Model 
VPS Virtual Private Server 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
MiM Man in the Middle 
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